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FEDERAL PRACTICE - POWER OF CHANCERY RECEIVER TO
MAINTAIN ACTION IN FOREIGN JURISDICTION - VENUE
- EQUITY
According to the orthodox doctrine, a chancery receiver having no
authority other than that which would arise from his appointment as
such, cannot maintain an action in another jurisdiction. Boothe v.
Clark, 17 How. Rep. (U.S.) 322, 15 L. Ed. 164 (1854). This view
has been expounded and criticized in numerous articles and treatises.
Wickersham, "Primary & Ancillary Receivers," 14 VA. L. REV. 599
(1928); First, "Extraterritorial Powers of Receivers," 27 ILL. L.
REv. 492 (1932); Laughlin, "The Extraterritorial Powers of Receiv-
ers," 45 HAP.. L. REv. 429 (1932); Rose, "Extraterritorial Actions
by Receivers," 17 MINN. L. REV. 704, 7o8 (1933); Bllig, "Cor-
porate Reorganization," 17 MINN. L. REV. 237, 255 (933). The
doctrine has recently been qualified to the extent that objection to the
capacity or manner of the foreign receiver's power to sue has been held
to be a personal privilege, like that of individual capacity of parties
plaintiff, and hence waived if not raised seasonably. McCandless v.
Furland, 55 S. Ct. 42, 79 L. Ed. 32 (Nov. 1934). In this case a
Pennsylvania federal receiver, on his own motion was appointed ancillary
receiver in a New York federal court. The objection to his capacity to
sue, however, was not raised until the receiver brought the principal
action, and then not until on appeal.
Justice Brandeis in recognizing that the incapacity of the foreign
receiver to sue in the Federal court may be waived, did not sanction the
practice of some lower federal courts which permit the appointment of
an ancillary receivership on application of the receiver himself. Cf. Gen.
Ord. in Bankruptcy, sec. 51 (11 U.S.C.A. sec. 53). However, the
Supreme Court expresses their view more clearly in Mitchell v. Maurer,
55 S. Ct. 162, (Dec. 1934), wherein Justice Brandeis seems to say
that where original jurisdiction in the federal court depends on diverse
citizenship, this diversity must be shown in the bill for ancillary appoint-
ment. In this case the original Delaware state receiver was a statutory
successor, with title, so that the disability to sue on the ground of Boothe
v. Clark, supra, is not in point.
In Mitchell v. Maurer, supra, Justice Brandeis recognizes the doc-
trine that, when original federal jurisdiction is based on diversity of
.citizenship, similar diversity need not be shown in ancillary or interven-
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don proceedings in the same district, but he expresses a strong doubt
both as to whether the rule may be extended to such actions when
brought in other districts, and as to whether a suit for the appointment
of an ancillary receiver in another federal district could be classed as an
ancillary suit within the meaning of this rule. Cinn, etc., R. Co. v.
Indianapolis, etc., R. Co., 270 U.S. 107, 46 S. Ct. 221, 70 L. Ed. 490
(1926); Rouse v. Letcher, 156 U.S. 47, 49, 15 S. Ct. 266, 39 L. Ed.
341 (1895); White v. Ewing, 159 U.S. 36, 15 S. Ct. 18, 4o L. Ed.
67 (1895). In Raphael v. Trask, 194 U.S. 272, 278, 24 S. Ct. 647,
48 L. Ed. 973 (1904), it is intimated that the jurisdiction of a federal
court cannot be based upon an original suit in another federal court.
It should be noticed that in the Mitchell case, supra, the original receiver
was appointed in the Delaware state court so that what Justice Brandeis
said as to necessity of diversity in an ancillary proceeding is dicta, but
very strong dicta.
It would seem from these two cases, McCandless v. Furland, supra,
and Mitchell v. Maurer, supra, that while the practice of some of the
lower courts allowing ancillary appointment upon application of the
original equity receiver, may continue, yet if such appointment is season-
ably challenged by a creditor in an action against him, the right to sue
will not be sustained. Capacity to sue, however, should be distinguished
from jurisdictional questions, as the latter cannot be waived. Mans-
field, etc.,R. Co. v. Swan, iii U.S. 379, 382, 4 S. Ct. 510, 28 L. Ed.
462 (1884).
The federal provision which prohibits suits between citizens of dif-
ferent states to be brought elsewhere than in the district of the residence
of either plaintiff or defendant (28 U.S.C.A. Sec. 112, Judicial Code
Sec. 51, amended) can cause no practical difficulties in cases which in-
volve censent receiverships because the requirement of venue is a privi-
lege or pesonal exemption and may be waived by the defendant. Mat-
trazzo v. Hustis, (D.C.N.Y. 1919) 256 Fed. 882; Central Trust Co.
v. McGeorge, 151 U.S. 129, 14 S. Ct. 286, 38 L. Ed. 98 (1894).
Such waiver is conclusive upon intervening creditors. Central Trust
Co. v. McGeorge, supra; Horne v. Pere Marquette R. Co., 151 Fed.
626 (1907); Hughes, "Federal Practice," Vol. 3, sec. 223, (p. 425).
However, in a contested case it would be more difficult to satisfy the
requirement by obtaining a resident in each state in which ancillary ap-
pointment is sought.
In Mitchell v. Maurer, supra, another situation arises which has
vexed the courts for some time, but which it was not necessary to decide
due to the ruling that the receiver was not properly appointed in the
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ancillary proceeding. That is, whether or not the federal courts will
apply their ordinary rules of comity in cases which involve concurrent
jurisdictions. Covell v. Hyman, iii U.S. 176, 182, 28 L. Ed. 390
(1884). In the Mitchell case, supra, there was a contest between a
California State Insurance Commissioner and a federal ancillary re-
ceiver for the possession of California property of a foreign insurance
company. If the federal receivership had been upheld the property in
question would have been placed in the hands of the federal receiver,
although in fact it was in the hands of the state official when the federal
receiver was appointed. The ordinary rules of concurrent jurisdiction
in such cases were laid down in Harkin v. Brundage, 276 U.S. 36, 48 S4
Ct. 268, 72 L. Ed. 457 (1928), which held that when two suits have
substantially the same purpose and jurisdictions of the courts are con-
current, the one whose jurisdiction and process are first invoked by the
filing of the bill is entitled to possession of the property, but that when
the remedies sought are dissimilar, the court which first actually takes
possession will prevail. See Moran v. Sturges, 284 of 154 U.S., 14
S. Ct. lo9 (1894); Tracey, "Corporate Foreclosures," Chap. 7,.
sec. 74, 75, 76; Clark, "Receivers," Vol. i, Chap. 9, sec. 288, 289,
290, 291.
The effect of this test would be to pit the federal and state ma-
chinery against each other in actions which involve the liquidation of
insurance companies, banks, and building and loan associations. This
unfortunate result, however, is avoided in three recent cases, in which
Justice Stone while recognizing the rules of Harkin v. Brundage, supra,
held that in the absence of a showing that the interest of the federal
petitioners would not be adequately protected under the state procedure,
the federal courts in exercise of their judicial discretion should relinquish
their jurisdiction in favor of the administration by the state official,
even though the federal courts could have established prior jurisdiction.
Pennsylvania v. Williams, 55 S. Ct. 380 (Feb. 1935); Penn. Gen.
Casualty Co. v. Pennsylvania, 55 S. Ct. 386 (Feb. 1935); Gordon v.
Ominsky, 55 S. Ct. 391 (Feb. 1935); see also Gordon v. Washington,
55 S. Ct. 584 (April 1935).
While the Supreme Court has thus applied the doctrine of comity to
avoid unseemly contests between federal and state courts, in Clark v.
Willard, 55 S. Ct. 356 (Feb. 1935), it sanctions a refusal of comity
in state court contests between foreign receivers who are vested with
title, and local creditors. Consult note, 48 Har.L.Rev. 845 (x935).
Receivers who are vested with title, either as statutory successors or as
assignees, are recognized exceptions to the rule of Boothe v. Clark,
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supra. Relfe v. Rundle, 103 U.S. 222, 26 L. Ed. 337 (188o);
Hawkins v. Glenn, 131 U.S. 319, 9 S. Ct. 739 (1889). But these
cases did not decide that the receiver's title should be recognized in other
states to the detriment of local creditors.
In the Clark case, supra, Justice Cardozo upheld the rule that a
foreign statutory successor may sue, but he also recognized that local
state policy may refuse recognition of a foreign receiver's statutory title
when such recognition would upset executions by local judgment credi-
tors. A dictum in the Clark case, supra, has a substantial bearing on
the rule of Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S. 243, 32 S. Ct. 415, 56
L. Ed. 479 (i912), which required that full faith and credit be given
the judgment of a court of the domicile of a corporation establishing
calls against stockholders double liability. In reference to this case,
Justice Cardozo said that nothing herein affected the power of the
state of the forum "to subject the proceeds of the cause of action or any
other assets to the claims of local creditors."
Clark v. Willard, supra, recognizes the rule of the assignment cases
that only through comity will statutory assignments be given extra-
territorial recognition. It would seem, then, at best, that a privilege
of foreign suit is of doubtful protection, either when there are creditors
of the forum who may attach, or when the rule of the forum permits
similar attachment by creditors from other states. Cf. Rose, "Extra-
territorial Actions by Receivers," supra, 704, 732. Only in corporate
reorganization cases may such preferential policies be avoided, by in-
voking the jurisdiction of sections 77 and 7 7 B of the Bankruptcy Act,
I i U.S.C.A. 205 and 207. It has been suggested that the jurisdiction
of the federal courts in all types of receiverships be extended to include
the entire country. See Annual Report of Special Committee on Equity
Receiverships of the Association of the Bar of the City of N. Y. 299-
331 (1927); Billig, "Corporate Reorganization," supra, 237, 256;
Rose, supra, 704, 731. Another remedy would be for the states to
enact statutes allowing the ancillary receivers of foreign insolvent cor-
porations to prevail over attaching creditors. See Ark. Dig. (1921)
(Crawford-Moses) sec. 5886. Applied in Standard Lumber Co. v.
Henry, 74 S.W. (2nd) 226 (1934). Consult note, 48 HAR. L. REv.
835, 841 (935).
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